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RECENT DECISIONS 
BANKRUPTCY-PROOF AND ALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS-REOPENING OF ESTATE 
To ALLOW CREDITORS To REAcH TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY-Husband 
(H) and wife (W) executed joint, unsecured promissory notes to each of 
two creditors, a realty company, and a bank. H, in default on both notes, 
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The petition listed both note-
holders as creditors; in addition, the schedule of assets noted that an 
interest in an estate by the entirety held by the bankrupt was not an asset 
of the bankrupt estate, since under state law it was not subject to the claims 
of creditors of only one spouse. After the first meeting of creditors, an order 
of discharge was entered without objection and H's estate was closed. The 
United States subsequently commenced suit against W individually on 
one of the notes assigned to it by the creditor bank. Nineteen days later, 
more than six months after the filing of H's petition, W initiated bank-
ruptcy proceedings, listing the creditors on the two notes, and scheduling 
her interest in the same estate held by the entirety. Upon application by 
the United States the district court issued an ex parte order reopening 
H's estate. The referee ordered consolidation of the estates of H and W 
and directed the trustee to sell the property held by the entirety for the 
benefit of the joint creditors. The district court upheld the order.1 On 
appeal, held, affirmed. Where property held by the entirety would have 
been immune from administration by the trustee in successive bankruptcy 
proceedings by husband and wife, the court did not abuse its discretion by 
reopening H's closed estate, consolidating it with that of W, and order-
ing sale of the property held by the entirety for the benefit of joint 
creditors of H and W. Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1962). 
At common law, a spouse's interest in an estate by the entirety received 
broad protection. The estate was conceived of as a legal entity, held per 
tout and not by the moieties;2 as a result, creditors could not reach the 
debtor spouse's interest in the property so held.3 With the enactment of 
married women's property acts,4 which accorded legal recognition to the 
1 In re Reid, 198 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Va. 1961). 
2 "By the common law of England • • • a conveyance to husband and wife does not 
constitute them joint tenants •••• They are, in the contemplation of the common law, 
but one person, and hence they take, not by moieties, but the entirety .•.. As stated 
by Blackstone, 'husband and wife being considered as one person in law, they cannot 
take the estate by moieties, but both are seized of the entirety, per tout, et non per my; 
the consequence of which is, that neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of any 
part without the assent of the other, but the whole estate must remain to the survivor.' 
2 Black Com. 182." Tyler v. United States, 28 F.2d 887, 890 (D. Md. 1928). 
8 See, e.g., Edwards 8: Chamberlain Hardware Co. v. Pethick, 250 Mich. 315, 230 
N.W. 186 (1930). See also Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1235 (1933). 
4 See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 557.1-.255 (1948). The purpose of such statutes is 
set forth in typical fashion as follows: "An Act abrogating the common law -disability 
of women so far as to make and render them competent to bind themselves and become 
liable with their husbands upon any instrument, so as to subject the real estate of the 
husband and wife owned by them as tenants by the entirety ..• to the payment and 
satisfaction of judgments and decrees of courts." MICH. COMP. LAws § 557.11 (1948). 
[ 1351] 
1352 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
wife's right to manage and control her separate estate, the common-law 
concept of a tenancy by the entirety underwent significant change. Under 
such statutes, a wife may hold property in her own name/• may contract, 6 
and may become jointly liable with her husband.7 Moreover, in some 
jurisdictions a creditor of either husband or wife may subject the rights 
of the debtor spouse to the payment of the obligation. Upon execution 
against property so held, the creditor acquires such rights as the debtor 
had, including the right to share possession of the property as a tenant 
in common with the non-debtor spouse, as well as the right of survivor-
ship should the debtor spouse survive the non-debtor.8 
Yet, in those few states where the common-law view of' an estate by 
the entirety as a separate legal entity persists, a creditor with a joint 
judgment may perfect a lien upon property held by the entirety only where 
the husband and wife are joint obligors.9 The estate by the entirety still 
cannot be reached by one who stands in the relation of creditor to only 
one of the parties, whether husband or wife.10 Therefore, in separate bank-
ruptcy proceedings involving only one spouse, his or her interest in the 
tenancy by the entirety does not vest in the trustee in bankruptcy.11 
Moreover, once a debtor's spouse has been discharged in bankruptcy, the 
joint creditor will generally be prevented from obtaining a joint judgment 
and levy upon the estate held by the entirety.12 
5 MICH. CoMP. LAws § 557.1 (1948). 
6 MICH. COMP. LAws § 557.51 (1948). 
7 MICH. COMP. LAws § 557.52 (1948). 
8 BURBY, REAL PROPERTY § 193, at 335 n.51 (2d ed. 1954), cites cases from New Jersey 
and New York. 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 623, at 667 nn.69-70 (1954 ed.), lists Arkansas, 
New Jersey, New York and Oregon as states which follow this doctrine. In Kentucky 
and Tennessee, the creditor may not reach the debtor spouse's right to possession, but 
he may acquire a contingent right of survivorship. Id. at 666. In contrast, although 
Michigan has adopted married women's property acts, the common-law view is retained. 
Therefore, individual creditors of either spouse may not have their claims satisfied out 
of the entirety estate. Dutcher v. Van Duine, 242 Mich. 477, 219 N.W. 651 (1928). See 
Bienenfeld, Creditors v. Tenancies by the Entirety, 1 WAYNE L. REv. 105 (1955). 
9 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 557.53(3) (1948), which provides: "Hereafter the 
real estate of the husband and wife owned by them as tenants by the entirety • • • shall 
be liable to seizure and sale on execution •.. in satisfaction of any judgment which has 
been recovered against the persons who were at the time of execution of such written 
instrument husband and wife jointly or the survivor upon any instrument signed by 
both." 
10 E.g., Dioguardi v. Curran, 35 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1929). See also Annot., 166 A.L.R. 
969 (1947). 
11 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70a(5), 30 Stat. 565, as amended, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 
U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1958), provides that the trustee shall be vested with title to property 
"which prior to the filing of the petition he [the bankrupt] could by any means have 
transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against 
him ..•• " Since the entirety property cannot be conveyed or assigned by one spouse 
without the consent of the other spouse [McMullen v. Zabawski, 283 Fed. 552 (E.D. Mich. 
1922)], and the interest of one spouse in the estate cannot be levied upon and sold 
under judicial process against one of such tenants by the entirety [In re Berry, 247 Fed. 
700 (E.D. Mich. 1917)], the bankrupt's interest in the entirety estate does not vest in 
the trustee. 
12 See, e.g., Ades v. Caplan, 132 Md. 66, 103 Atl. 94 (1918). See 43 HARV. L. REv. 
312 (1929). 
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Courts have experimented with various procedural devices to extend 
the reach of creditor process against property held by the entirety. Com-
monly, where the husband has filed a petition for bankruptcy, but has 
not yet obtained a discharge, the joint creditor may petition the bank-
ruptcy court for a stay of proceedings, during which period he may obtain, 
in a state court, a joint judgment and lien against the property held by the 
entirety.13 However, where one spouse has already been discharged in 
bankruptcy, there is much diversity of opinion as to whether any recourse 
is still available to a creditor of one of the spouses. Some courts have held 
that a joint creditor cannot proceed against the entirety estate after one 
spouse has been individually discharged in bankruptcy.14 Other juris-
dictions have been more flexible. Michigan, for example, authorizes the 
creditor to bring a quasi in rem action against the entirety estate itself15 
on the theory that bankruptcy discharges only personal liability and does 
not destroy the debt itself. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that a 
note executed by a husband and wife establishes not only a joint and 
several liability as to each of them, but also an obligation of the "distinct 
legal unity" to which the marital relationship gives rise. Under this view, 
the obligation so created constitutes a separate debt which, together with 
the entirety estate, remains outside the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
court.16 Another recent decision allowed creditors to reach property held 
by the entirety on the theory that the function of a proceeding in bank-
ruptcy was a very limited one, that of providing the bankrupt with merely 
an affirmative defense to a liability which, itself, remains intact.17 Since 
the defense of discharge could be raised only with respect to such assets 
as were available for distribution in the prior bankruptcy proceeding, it 
could not be asserted as to entirety property which had there been excluded 
from the court's control. 
The principal case sanctions a more effective and straightforward means 
of intervention by the court and thereby avoids the inequities resulting 
from immunizing the entirety property of successive bankrupts. Without 
resort to theoretical sleight of hand, the district court, in reopening the 
proceeding, made use of the broadened powers granted it by the Chandler 
13 See, e.g., Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1931). See also Annot., 82 
A.L.R. 1235 (1933). 
14 See, e.g., Wharton v. Citizens' Bank, 233 Mo. App. 236, 15 S.W.2d 860 (1929). "The 
only right that appellant [creditor bank on a joint note] ever had was to obtain a 
judgment against the husband and wife jointly, and thus perfect a lien upon the real 
estate which they owned as tenants by the entirety. • . . When the husband received 
his discharge in bankruptcy, appellant's right to a joint judgment against the spouses 
was destroyed ••.. The discharge is res adjudicata." Id. at 240, 15 S.W.2d at 863. 
15 l\lICH. COMP. LAws § 557.53 (1948). See Kolakowski v. Cyman, 285 Mich. 585, 281 
N.W. 332 (1938). "[T]he statute, in effect, subjects the entireties property to a non-
personal or quasi in rem liability, which is not dischargeable in bankruptcy." Id. at 
590, 281 N.W. at 335. 
10 First Nat'! Bank v. Pothuisje, 217 Ind. I, 25 N.E.2d 436 (1940). 
17 United States v. Fetter, 163 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Mich. 1958). See 1 COLLI.ER, BANK• 
RUPTCY § 1606 (14th ed. 1962). 
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Act.18 The old Bankruptcy Act of 1898 had limited the court's power to 
reopen bankruptcy proceedings to instances in which "it appears that 
they were closed before being fully administered."19 Section 2a(8) of the 
1938 Chandler Act now gives the court authority to "reopen estates for 
cause shown." However, this grant of broader discretion to reopen estates 
has not been accompanied by increased procedural safeguards. Courts may 
continue to grant ex parte orders to reopen estates.20 The moving party 
need only present an application which states sufficient cause to reopen;21 
notice to the discharged bankrupt is unnecessary.22 
In addition, since the act fails to state a test for "cause shown," this 
determination must necessarily lie within the discretion of the court. 
Sufficient cause to reopen has been found to permit the inclusion of 
unadministered assets (perhaps the primary purpose),28 the amendment 
of schedules to include creditors not listed,24 and the recovery of excessive 
commissions obtained by fraud in violation of court orders.25 No explicit 
period of limitation has been formulated as a bar to reopening.26 On the 
other hand, applications for reopening have been denied for laches,21 and 
in those instances in which few additional assets would pass to the trustee 
under a second administration.28 Thus, the change introduced by the 
Chandler Act, allowing the court to "reopen estates for cause shown," has 
been interpreted as an expression of congressional intent to grant broader 
discretion to district courts to reopen estates.29 
The question before the court in the principal case was whether there 
existed sufficient cause to justify reopening of the estate. To determine 
what causes are sufficient, an evaluation of the objectives of the Bank-
is Section 2a(8), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § ll(a)(8) (1958), amending Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898, § 2a(8), 30 Stat. 545. 
19 Chapter 2, § 2, 30 Stat. 545. 
20 In re Carlucci Stone Co., 269 Fed. 795 (M.D. Pa. 1920). 
21 See, e.g., In re Snyder, 4 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1925). "[S)uch petition must be either 
in itself, or in connection with supporting affidavits, of such persuasive character as to 
reasonably satisfy the court of the requisite jurisdictional fact, namely, that there are 
some assets belonging to the bankrupt which have not been administered." Id. at 628. 
See 73 Stat. 571 (1959), 11 U.S.C. § 4l(c) (Supp. III, 1961), amending Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898, § 18c, 30 Stat. 551. 
22 In re Hopkins, 11 F. Supp. 831 (W.D.N.Y. 1934). 
28 In re Joslyn's Estate, 171 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1948). "It has been held that it is the 
duty of the bankruptcy court to re-open closed bankruptcy estates whenever prima facia 
proof has been made that they have not been fully administered." Id. at 164. Some 
courts have stated that existence of unadministered assets is the sole basis for reopening. 
See In re Forman, 45 F. Supp. 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1942). 
24 Casey v. Cooledge, 234 Ala. 499, 175 So. 557 (1937). But see Milando v. Perrone, 157 
F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1946). 
25 In re International Match Corp., 190 F.2d 458 (2d Cir. 1951). 
26 See, e.g., In re Thomas, 204 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1953); Brust v. Irving Trust Co., 
129 F. Supp. 462, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
21 In re Fair Creamery Co., 193 F.2d 5 (6th Cir. 1951) (delay of seven years). 
28 In re M. E. Smith & Co., 52 F.2d 212 (D. Neb. 1931). 
29 In re Cirillo, 102 F. Supp. 715 (M.D. Pa. 1952); In re United Brick & Tile Co., 
94 F. Supp. 269 (D. Del. 1950). See also In re Fox W. Coast Theatres, 25 F. Supp. 250 
(S.D. Cal. 1936). • 
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ruptcy Act is required. The court indicated that the primary aims of the 
act were stabilization of the insolvent debtor's financial position at the 
time of filing of the petition, the granting of relief from his existing fi-
nancial burdens, and the making available of his assets for satisfaction of 
his creditors.30 These objectives will be furthered to the extent that bank-
ruptcy proceedings are made final and certain; they will be undermined 
to the extent that closed estates are arbitrarily reopened. Moreover, in 
the principal case a further question might have been raised as to whether 
such relief should have been granted in the light of the parties' conduct. 
The creditors had willingly accepted these unsecured notes; H and W 
had violated no explicit provisions of the Bankruptcy Act; the creditors, 
at the time of H's separate bankruptcy, could have obtained a stay of 
the bankruptcy proceedings while they instituted joint actions against H 
and W on the notes.31 In failing to pursue the available remedies, the 
creditors seemingly were guilty of a lack of diligence which might be con-
sidered sufficient to preclude the relief here granted. Yet, within the limits 
imposed by the equitable doctrine of laches,32 counterbalancing weight 
must be given to the duty of the bankruptcy court to construe the statute 
to serve the best interests of all the parties.33 Thus, a court might be 
justified in granting relief to prevent what has been termed a "fraud on 
the law" in a situation where, as in the principal case, an inequitable out-
come might result even though the literal requirements of the Bankruptcy 
Act have been satisfied. Thus, because the obvious effect of failure to re-
open H's closed estate would be to exclude from the reach of lawful 
creditors the total entirety property, and because the interval between 
the filing of H's and W's bankruptcy petitions was only six months, it 
cannot be said that the court's action in reopening the estate constituted 
an abuse of discretion. 
Robert V. Seymour 
30 Principal case at !155. 
31 See materials cited in note l!I supra. 
32 See note 27 supra. See also In re John Viviane & Son, 1!12 F. Supp. 63!1 (S.D.N.Y. 
1955). 
33 Since both creditors in the principal case were in fact joint creditors, the corollary 
problem concerning the rights of individual creditors to share in the proceeds of the 
sale of the entirety property was not explicitly raised. It has been held that, although 
the entirety property remains immune where husband and wife file separate bankruptcy 
petitions, if the proceedings are consolidated and a single trustee is appointed, the 
entirety estate may be sold for the benefit of both joint and individual creditors. In re 
Carpenter, 5 F. Supp. 101 (M.D. Pa. 19!1!1). As a result, the joint creditor must share 
the entirety property with individual creditors who, before the bankruptcy proceedings, 
had no chance of realizing their claims out of the entirety estate. See Bienenfeld, supra 
note 8; !14 COLUM. L. REv. 762 (19!14). 
